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I. Introduction
It is a rather simple question. Is a taxpayer permitted to forego a deduction or credit for which the
taxpayer otherwise qualifies? Even before it is answered, the question triggers another. Why
would a taxpayer even dream of ignoring something so wonderful, from a tax perspective, as a
deduction or credit? As explained in Part II of this article, tax deductions and credits sometimes
are not as beneficial as one might expect, even to the point of being disadvantageous, for tax or
other purposes.
The simple question can be asked more succinctly. Are tax deductions and credits, in the absence
of a specific provision to the contrary, mandatory? Phrased in this fashion, the question might
tempt some to see the answer in the very asking, much as one can with an almost-as-important
query, AIs chocolate delicious?@ The urge to begin with the words AOf course@ is too much for
many to resist. In this instance, though, it is dangerous to assume that deductions and credits are
mandatory.
For some, the asking of the question is almost a surprise. One might expect that more than eight
decades of federal income tax law history would leave no basic question unanswered. Yet the
debate over the permissive or mandatory quality of deductions has twice cascaded through the
American Bar Association=s TAX-LAW listserv, generating two of the longest-lasting, deep, and
intense discussions on that list, and attracting at least, if not more, participants than any other
thread to have made its rounds among its members. Perhaps those two discussions, one in the
spring of 2004 and the other in the spring of 2006, inspired the two short articles that appeared
shortly thereafter, one in May of 20041 and the other in May of 2006.2 Neither article, though,
provides, nor perhaps was intended to provide, an extensive, in-depth analysis of the question.
When numerous tax practitioners invest meaningful amounts of time discussing an issue, it is
safe to conclude that the issue matters. On that point, there is no disagreement. The issue, though
periodically moving to the edges of the tax stage in years gone by, is ready to take the spotlight,
principally because increasing tax complexity has changed the value of tax deductions and
credits.
The practical relevance of the question is highlighted by the controversy swirling about a
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settlement that Boeing reached with the federal government. In July of 2006, Boeing announced
that it would not deduct $615 million it agreed to pay the government to settle charges that it had
violated ethical rules in obtaining documents from a rival manufacturer and that it had recruited a
military weapons buyer in violation of other rules, even though it claims it is entitled to the
deduction.3 If, as some argue, deductions must be claimed, how can Boeing=s decision to forego a
deduction it claims is justified withstand scrutiny by the IRS? Does Boeing=s attempt to score
points in the arena of public relations justify its stance? It isn=t just Boeing, because other
companies reaching settlements with the government with respect to other types of disputes have
accepted provisions in the settlement agreement by which they promise not to deduct the
payments.4 Do these provisions violate the tax law? The core issue addressed by this article has
been moved into a national spotlight on account of the Boeing situation, and its analysis should
help answer the specific questions raised in this paragraph, together with the others that arise in
the course of exploring the matter.
After explaining why the issue exists and is becoming more important, this article will explore
the various arguments that can be, and have been, raised in support of the proposition that all
deductions are mandatory and in support of the proposition that only certain deductions, for
specific purposes, are mandatory whereas the others are optional. The proposition that all
deductions are optional is untenable under existing law, and thus is discussed only in the context
of policy options available to legislators who choose to address the issue. The question of
whether credits must be claimed is not treated separately, but is left to ride tandem with the
arguments and discussion applicable to the claiming of deductions.
This article concludes that only certain deductions, for specific purposes, are mandatory, leaving
taxpayers with an option with respect to other deductions and credits. For simplicity sake, this
position is described as the Amost deductions are optional@ approach. The contrary position easily
is tagged as the Aall deductions are mandatory@ approach, even though its adherents concede that
deductions requiring an election are ipso facto optional.
II. Why Turn Down a Tax Break?
A. In General
It is widely believed that tax deductions and tax credits are tax Abreaks,@ that is, they contribute to
a reduction of a taxpayer=s tax liability. Accordingly, deductions and credits are considered
3
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beneficial to taxpayers, and items for which taxpayers aim some of their planning goals.5
Considerable resources are devoted to making a taxpayer=s transactions Afit@ the definitional and
other requirements of a deduction or credit.
Yet there are instances in which a tax deduction or credit either is worthless to the taxpayer or
disadvantageous. Worthless deductions and credits are those for which a taxpayer has no use. For
example, a taxpayer whose non-business deductions exceed gross income has no use for
additional deductions, because those deductions would enlarge a loss that cannot be carried to
other taxable years. That deductions and credits can be useless is demonstrated by the existence,
in some states of statutory provisions permitting taxpayers with otherwise useless state income
tax credits of one sort or another to sell those credits to other taxpayers who can make use of
them.6
Sometimes, however, a tax deduction or credit can cause a taxpayer=s tax liability to increase.
Though seemingly counter-intuitive, the complex relationship among various federal income tax
provisions can have that effect. For example, in some instances, decreases in adjusted gross
income or taxable income reduce a credit and thus create an incentive to forego a deduction
because the salvaged credit exceeds the tax savings generated by the deduction. Examples of
these disadvantageous situations are explored in B through G of this Part II.
At other times, a tax deduction or credit can foreclose a taxpayer, or someone related or
otherwise connected to the taxpayer, from qualifying for a non-tax benefit. For example, some
benefit programs require that a person is ineligible if someone else claims a dependency
exemption deduction for that person. Similarly, taxpayers may want to disregard deductions or
credits because the cost and aggravation of anticipated routine audits involving these items are
seen as out-weighing the putative tax benefit. Some taxpayers consider privacy more important
than a deduction, and other taxpayers may seek beneficial publicity from declining to claim a
deduction. These and similar situations are explored in H through K of this Part II.
The instances described in B through K of this article are but some of the situations in which a
taxpayer would benefit in some way from declining to claim a tax deduction or credit. For
purposes of analyzing the core question, it is not essential to identify every such instance. It is not
unlikely that continued changes in the tax law not only will create more situations in which
taxpayers would choose to ignore a deduction or credit, but also will cause some of the presently
identified circumstances to become moot or obsolete.
B. Alternative Minimum Tax
Under certain circumstances, an itemized deduction can cause the taxpayer=s alternative
5
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minimum tax (AMT) to increase by an amount greater than the reduction in regular tax generated
by the deduction. In this instance, from a tax planning perspective, a taxpayer is better off
ignoring the deduction.7 Whether, from a tax compliance perspective, the taxpayer should ignore
the deduction is at the root of the question this article addresses.
One situation in which a taxpayer=s total tax liability increases on account of a deduction arises
when four factors are present: taxable income is less than the beginning of the 25 percent
bracket; adjusted net capital gain exceeds taxable income; taxable income is less than AMTI less
the AMT exemption; and items that are deductible for regular tax are not deductible for AMT.8
Whether Congress should change this particular glitch is left for others to discuss.9
Another situation, described by an ABA-TAX listserv participant, involved a taxpayer whose
total tax liability would decrease by $3,560 if the taxpayer ignored $35,600 of state tax
payments.10 If a deduction is not going to decrease the taxpayer=s total tax liability, and might
even increase it, is there any point in claiming the deduction?
C. Social Security Benefit Computations
Because social security benefits generally are higher if earned income during pre-retirement years
is higher,11 there is an incentive for self-employed individuals to understate business deductions
if the tax reduction afforded by those deductions has less present value than that of the
anticipated increases in post-retirement social security benefits.12 The IRS takes a dim view of
this particular strategy,13 as discussed in IX, C, below.
D. Maximizing Deferred Compensation Contributions
Because in most instances the amount that can be set aside in a qualified tax-deferred
7
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compensation plan by self-employed individuals reflects the taxpayer=s net profit,14 there is an
incentive for self-employed individuals to understate business deductions if the tax reduction
afforded by those deductions has less present value than that of the combined present value of the
deduction for the contribution to the plan and the net present value of the after-tax retirement
benefits generated by the plan.15
E. Avoiding Application of Section 183 Not-for-Profit Activity Deduction Limitations
Taxpayers engaging in activities that frequently fail to generate an annual profit sometimes will
have good reason to forego a deduction so that the activity shows a profit in a sufficient number
of years to qualify for the presumption in section 183(d) that treats an activity as for-profit if it
shows a profit in at least three of five consecutive years.16 For example, a taxpayer whose activity
has shown a profit in two of the preceding four years and a loss in the other two needs to show a
profit in the current, fifth year in order to avoid retroactive denial of the net loss deducted in the
two previous loss-generating years. One way of showing that profit is to ignore sufficient
deductions, and the resulting tax liability on the profit so generated most likely will be less than
the tax savings generated by the net losses incurred in the two previous loss-generating years.
Whether the taxpayer is permitted to so act is at the root of the question addressed in this article,
though, as discussed in VIII, B, below, the IRS appears to foreclose this particular tax planning
gambit.
F. Maximizing the Earned Income Tax Credit
Because the earned income tax credit reflects a percentage of the taxpayer=s earned income,17
there is an incentive for taxpayers to ignore deductions as a means to obtaining a much more
valuable credit.18 Deductions reduce tax liability by an amount equal to the deduction multiplied
by the taxpayer=s effective marginal income tax rate, but credits reduce tax liability dollar for
dollar.19 Although many taxpayers attempt to maximize the earned income tax credit by
14
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fabricating and report non-existing earned income,20 the opportunity to increase earned income
by choosing not to claim deductions is very real.21 As it has with any attempt to maximize social
security benefits by reducing self-employment deductions, the IRS has rejected this strategy
because the earned income tax credit cross-references the definition of self-employment
income,22 as discussed in IX, D, below.
G. Qualifying for Education Credits
Because the section 25A Hope Scholarship23 and Lifetime Learning Credits24 cannot be claimed
by a taxpayer with respect to whom a section 151 dependency exemption deduction is allowed to
another taxpayer,25 that other taxpayer can make the credits available to an otherwise qualifying
taxpayer by choosing not to claim the dependency exemption deduction for that taxpayer. If the
taxpayer who chooses to forego the dependency exemption deduction has an adjusted gross
income high enough to reduce or eliminate the amount of his or her dependency exemption
deduction because of the phase-out,26 that taxpayer has nothing to lose, tax-wise, from foregoing
what would be a zero or insignificant deduction. As discussed in VIII, A, below, the IRS has put
its imprimatur on this particular strategy,27 making it impossible to put the IRS into either the
deductions are mandatory or deductions are optional camps because of its position with respect
to omitted deductions in the self-employment income computation context.
H. Reducing the Chances of an Audit and Audit Tactics
It is generally believed that many of the taxpayers who choose to forego deductions and credits
do so because they think that it will reduce the chances of an IRS audit of their tax returns.28 One
Taxes,@ 39 Tax L. Rev. 227, 230 n.8 (1984).
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commentator references the matter thusly, AHowever, the results of taxpayer surveys suggest that
a substantial number of taxpayers intentionally fail to take deductions to which they are
entitled.@29 Even though there is doubt that this taxpayer perception reflects the reality of audit
selection,30 this approach also triggers the question this article addresses.
For decades, tax practitioners have advised taxpayers and each other that amending a tax return
to claim an overlooked deduction or to increase a claimed but miscalculated deduction should not
be undertaken unless the amount involved is so substantial that the tax savings overwhelm the
alleged increase in chances of audit supposedly caused by the filing of an amended return.31
Again, regardless of the validity of the Aamended return as red flag@ warning, the question
addressed in this article can be posed in alternative terms, namely, AMust a taxpayer who
discovers an unintentionally overlooked or understated deduction amend his or her income tax
return?@
Another practice involving audits that also relates to the core question is that of bringing
previously unclaimed deductions to an audit to present to the auditor when the auditor disallows
deductions that have been claimed on the return.32 If doing so is somehow improper, no one
Claiming Deductions,@ 84 Taxes 43, 46 (May 2006) (AA taxpayer may choose not to claim a
home office deduction or some other business deduction because she fears it will increase her
likelihood of getting audited...@); Watson, AAn Analysis of >Meeting or Dealing= for Home Office
Deductions,@ 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1075, n. 59 (AThere are some negative tax ramifications that ...
may persuade eligible taxpayers to forego home office deductions. ... For a general discussion,
see Kennedy & Anderson, Recent Changes Make It Easier to Deduct Costs Related to an Officeat-Home 12 Tax'n for Law. 18, 21 (1983). See also Everett, Home Office Expense Deductions:
More Trouble Than They are Worth?, 58 Taxes 589 (1980).@).
29
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1, 21 (American Bar Foundation, Working Paper No. 8716)).
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seems to have encountered objections from the IRS.33 Yet there does not exist any specific
authority endorsing or prohibiting the practice.
I. Keeping Information Private
Taxpayers might refuse to claim a deduction because they do not want the information required
for substantiating the deduction to be made available to a government agency34 or to a private
enterprise that examines a person=s tax return as part of a process to determine if the person
qualifies for a loan, to determine the financial health of a potential investor, or to achieve some
similar purpose.35 Taxpayers may want to keep private the identity of charitable gift recipients,
the amount spent on a safe deposit box, the amount paid as alimony, the fact alimony has been
paid, or the details of medical expenses.36
J. Public Relation Coups
As illustrated by the Boeing announcement that it would not deduct $615 million it agreed to pay
the federal government to settle charges that it had violated ethical rules while engaged in several
business activities, a corporation and perhaps even individuals can Ascore points@ in the media by
Asacrificing@ deductions that public considers unsuitable, even though the tax law permits the
deduction. Though in Boeing=s case, giving up the deduction allegedly will increase its tax
liability, the incentive to make such a Asacrifice@ strengthens when the taxpayer has little or no
need for the deduction.
K. Qualifying for Non-tax Benefits
Because a variety of non-tax benefits are denied to a potential recipient if a dependency
exemption deduction is allowed to another person with respect to that potential recipient,37 the
that very likely would be allowed if claimed, challenged, and resolved by a court. Then, when
audited on other issues, as the IRS "takes away" deductions, the taxpayers reach into their pocket
and drag out some of the ones held in reserve. I don't like this approach, but I've never heard of
the IRS proposing penalties on account of the deductions that were not claimed until the audit.@).
33
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taxpayer who would otherwise be entitled to claim the deduction often has a good reason to
abandon the claim. As with the education credit qualification discussed in G, above, this is
particularly true if the taxpayer who chooses to forego the dependency exemption deduction has
an adjusted gross income high enough to reduce or eliminate the amount of his or her
dependency exemption deduction because of the phase-out.38
The benefits that might be available to a taxpayer who chooses not to claim a dependency
exemption or other deduction include those offered through programs for disaster relief,
insurance settlements, bank loans, and sales of businesses.39 Whether the tax law would require
the taxpayer to claim the deduction is at the root of the question addressed in this article.
Whether the agency administering the non-tax benefit would consider the foregoing of the
deduction as valid is beyond the scope of this article.
III. Does AShall Be Allowed@ Mandate Deduction?
A. The Words of the Statute: A Road-Map to Nowhere
1. In General
It has been argued by advocates of the Aall deductions are mandatory@ approach that the Internal
Revenue Code literally requires a taxpayer to claim all deductions for which the taxpayer
otherwise qualifies because the term Ashall be allowed@ mandates taking the deduction into
account in computing taxable income.40 This argument rests on a sequential analysis of statutory
terms ultimately defining taxable income. Predictably, the language of the Internal Revenue Code
does not provide a definitive answer to the question of whether taxpayers are obligated to claim
every deduction for which they otherwise are eligible. At best, the language provides some clues
that assist in finding an answer through implication and inference.
2. Use of AAllowed@ in Defining Taxable Income
a. Taxable Income
2006) (qualifying for Medi-Cal); ATexas Residency - FAQ@,
http://www.utdallas.edu/residency/fac.html#8 (visited 31 July 2006) (parents not residing in
Texas and claiming child as dependent cause child not to qualify as Texas resident for tuition and
other purposes, and thus have incentive to forego dependency exemption deduction).
38
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2006 (ATherefore, the deductions which are allowed, must be taken.@).

Section 63(a) defines taxable income, with one exception, as Agross income minus the deductions
allowed by this chapter (other than the standard deduction).@41 The exception defines taxable
income for individuals who do not elect to itemize deductions, and provides that Ataxable income
means adjusted gross income minus the standard deduction and the deduction for personal
exemptions.@42 The adjusted gross income to which this definition refers is Agross income minus
the following deductions:@43 where Afollowing deductions@ is a list of deductions set forth in
section 62(a). All but two of those deductions, in turn, are referred to as AThe deductions allowed
by@ the particular provision for the selected item,44 whereas two are described as AAny deduction
allowable under this chapter ....@45
None of this language, though, answers the question. The definitions rest on the concept of
Adeductions allowed by this chapter@ but that is a term for which no definition appears in the
Code. Instead, the logical interpretation is that Adeductions allowed by this chapter@ means those
items for which a provision in Athis chapter@ allows a deduction. There is no issue, of course,
with Athis chapter@ because section 63 is in chapter 1, and thus Athis chapter@ means chapter 1 of
subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, which deals with ANormal Taxes and Surtaxes.@
b. Allowing Deductions
There are numerous provisions in chapter 1 that allow deductions. The language of those
provisions adds to the confusion surrounding the issue of whether deductions are mandatory.
A principal provision is section 161, which introduces the litany of deduction provisions
contained in Part VI of subchapter B of chapter 1. Part VI is captioned AItemized Deductions for
Individuals and Corporations,@ which is misleading because the word Aitemized@ is being used in
the sense of Alisting@ and not in the sense of Aitemized deductions@ as defined in section 63(d).
The latter provision defines itemized deductions as Adeductions allowable under this chapter
other than the deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income, and the deduction for
personal exemptions.@ Clearly some of the deductions listed in Part VI are allowable in
computing adjusted gross income and thus are not itemized deductions within the scope of
section 63(d). This is one reason that section 7806(b) essentially demands that caption titles be
ignored for purposes of substantive interpretation.46 A similar definition exists in section 211,
41
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which introduces the list of deduction provisions contained in Part VII of subchapter B of chapter
1. Part VII is captioned AAdditional Itemized Deductions for Individuals@ which by using the
word itemized is no less misleading than is the caption for Part VI. Another definition based on
the same pattern exists in section 241, which introduces the list of deduction provisions
contained in Part VIII of subchapter B of chapter 1. Part VIII is captioned ASpecial Deductions
for Corporations.@
Section 161 provides: AIn computing taxable income under section 63, there shall be allowed as
deductions the items specified in this part, subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261
and following, relating to items not deductible).@ Section 211 provides: AIn computing taxable
income under section 63, there shall be allowed as deductions the items specified in this part,
subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261 and following, relating to items not
deductible).@ Section 241 provides: AIn addition to the deductions provided in Part VI (sec. 161
and following), there shall be allowed as deductions in computing taxable income the items
specified in this part.@ The phrase Ashall be allowed@ also appears in some, but not all, of the
other deduction provisions in the Code, such as the section 611 deduction for depletion,47 the
section 642(b) personal exemption deduction for estates48 and trusts,49 the section 643(b)
charitable deduction for estates and trusts,50 the distributions deduction for estates and trusts,51
c. AShall Be Allowed@
The critical element of these definitions is the introduction of the phrase Ashall be allowed@ into
the tax lexicon. The term Ashall be allowed@ is not defined in the statute. Thus, even if the word
Ashall@ means Amust,@ as some have argued,52 the meaning of Aallowed@ remains determinative
because whatever it is that must be done is whatever Aallowed@ means. If the word Aallowed@
means Aclaimed@ then Ashall be allowed@ must be interpreted as Amust be claimed,@ making all
deductions mandatory. In contrast, if Aallowed@ means Apermitted,@ then Ashall be allowed@ must
be interpreted as Amust be permitted,@ which means that the claiming of the deduction is not
required. In further contrast, if Aallowed@ means Aaccepted@ or Aapproved,@ then Ashall be
47
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allowed@ must be interpreted as Amust be accepted@ or Amust be approved,@ making an otherwise
eligible deduction unassailable if claimed by the taxpayer.
Put another way, the question is whether Ashall be allowed@ means Amust be claimed on the
return@ or Amust be allowed if it is claimed on the return.@ By phrasing the question in this
manner, the issue becomes one of determining if the direction in the statute is an instruction to
the IRS to allow the claim if it is made or is an instruction to taxpayers that the deduction must
be claimed.
Complicating matters is the fact that the Ashall be allowed@ phrase does not always appear in
taxable and other income definitions. Sometimes the term allowed is used without Ashall be.@ For
example, section 832(a) defines insurance company taxable income as Agross income as defined
in section (b)(1) less the deductions allowed by subsection (c).@53 Section 512(a) defines
Aunrelated business taxable income@ as Agross income .... less the deductions allowed by this
chapter ....@ In other instances, the term Aallowable@ is used. For example, section 543(b) defines
Aadjusted ordinary gross income,@ a component of personal holding company income@ as
Aordinary gross income adjusted as follows: ... subtract the amount allowable as deductions for
...@54 Sometimes the term Aallowed@ or Aallowable@ does not appear. For example, section 801(b)
defines Alife insurance taxable income@ as Alife insurance gross income, reduced by life insurance
deductions.@55 Rather than supporting the argument that Ashall be allowed@ makes deductions
mandatory, this potpourri of language formulations adds strength to the position that the
particular words used to define various types of income do not inform the core question.
3. Impact of the Term AAllowable@
The statutory lexicon is complicated by use of the term Aallowable@ in describing deductions.
There are numerous provisions using the term Aallowable@ to modify the word Adeduction@ or
Adeductions,@ though a description of a few is sufficient to illustrate the point.
In computing of the section 21 household and dependent care credit, taxpayers are not permitted
to take into account payments to individuals for whom a dependency exemption deduction is
allowable to the taxpayer or the taxpayer=s spouse.56 The exclusion for employer-provided
dependent care assistance does not apply to payments made by the employer to individuals for
whom a dependency exemption deduction is allowable to the employee or the employee=s
spouse.57
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In computing adjusted gross income, eighteen enumerated deductions that are allowed to the
taxpayer are subtracted from gross income, whereas two deductions, one for jury pay remitted to
an employer and the other for attorney fees and costs arising from certain discrimination
litigation recoveries, are subtracted if they are Aallowable@ to the taxpayer.58 Itemized deductions,
for purposes of computing taxable income, are defined as deductions allowable under chapter 1
other than deductions allowable in computing adjusted gross income and the personal exemption
deduction.59 Impairment-related work expenses, which are excepted from the section 67 twopercent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions, are defined as certain expenses of
handicapped individuals with respect to which a deduction is allowable under section 162.60 The
reduction of itemized deductions under section 68 applies to Aitemized deductions otherwise
allowable for the taxable year.@61
Computation of the exclusion for employee achievement awards depends on whether the cost to
the employer of the award exceeds or does not exceed the amount allowable to the employer as a
deduction for the cost of the award.62 Investment interest for purposes of the limitation on the
deduction of investment interest is defined as Aany interest allowable as a deduction@ under
chapter 1.63
The reduction in the adjusted basis of depreciable property is the amount of depreciation allowed
as deductions but Anot less than the amount allowable@ under the tax law.64 Depreciation
recapture for personalty applies to Aall adjustments reflected in ... adjusted basis on account of
deductions ... allowed or allowable ... for depreciation or amortization,65 but if the taxpayer can
establish that the amount allowed for any period was less than the amount allowable, recapture is
limited to the amount allowed.66 A similar rule applies to depreciation recapture on real
property.67
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The use of the term Aallowable@ suggests that the term means something other than Aallowed.@
For example, the statutory provision dealing with the impact of depreciation on adjusted basis
provides that adjusted basis is reduced by the amount of allowable depreciation even if the
allowed depreciation is less, a condition that acknowledges not only a difference between the two
terms but also that a taxpayer may deduct less depreciation than is allowable. Similarly, the
definition of depreciation that is subject to depreciation recapture also acknowledges the
difference between Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ but also the existence of situations in which
taxpayers have deducted less depreciation than was allowable. Sparing a taxpayer from
depreciation recapture treatment for allowable but unallowed depreciation deductions is
inconsistent with the notion that Ashall be allowed@ means Amust be deducted.@ The term
Aallowed@ means something other than a required deduction for all that is allowable.
So in using both terms, Congress clearly implies that they have different meanings. Yet Congress
did not provide definitions for the two terms. Implications are valuable, but more is required.
When a statute uses words that it does not define, it becomes helpful to ascertain how the IRS
and the courts have interpreted those words.
B. IRS Perspectives: A Road Sign of Some Clarity
Decades ago, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the IRS= predecessor, weighed in with its
distinction between the terms Aallowable@ and Aallowed@:
The word Aallowable@ designates the amount permitted or granted by the statutes,
as distinguished from the word Aallowed@ which refers to the deduction actually
permitted or granted by the Bureau.68
In reaching this conclusion, the Bureau reasoned consistently with statutory interpretation
principles set forth by the Supreme Court for terms used in, but not defined by, a statute.
According to the Court, the meaning of an undefined term must be determined from its Aknown
and ordinary signification.@69 Put another way, Athe plain, obvious and rational meaning of a
statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the
exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would
discover.@70 It makes no difference that the term in question is in a tax statute.71
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Looking to everyday use, something is allowable if it is permissible.72 Something that is
permissible is something that is an opportunity, and cannot be something that is a requirement.73
Thus, an allowable deduction is one that the taxpayer is permitted to claim, just as the Bureau
concluded. All deductions for which a taxpayer qualifies, therefore, are allowable deductions,
and any attempt to deduct an item that is not allowable, if detected, will be rejected because the
item is not allowable as a deduction. Logically, therefore, no item can be claimed as a deduction
unless it is allowable.
What does it mean, then, for a deduction to be allowed? It must mean that something has
happened to the item in question to move it beyond the character of merely being allowable.
According to the Bureau, a deduction that is allowed is a deduction that is permitted or granted.
Barring a mistake or failure to audit a return, the IRS would not permit a taxpayer to deduct an
item that is not allowable.74
What matters most from the Bureau=s interpretation, which the IRS has not rescinded, is that
allowable and allowed are two different concepts. There must be, therefore, allowable deductions
that are not allowed. Barring an error, the IRS would not, and should not, refuse to a taxpayer a
deduction that is allowable to the taxpayer. Accordingly, allowable but unallowed deductions
will exist if the taxpayer fails to claim an allowable deduction. As this article explains, it is not
unusual for taxpayers to forego allowable deductions.
What necessarily follows is the concept that a deduction does not become allowed until the
taxpayer does something to trigger allowance of an allowable deduction, by doing whatever is
required to claim the deduction on the return. In turn, this permits the IRS to accept the claimed
deduction, thus causing it to become an Aallowed@ deduction or to reject the deduction, thus
causing it to be Adisallowed@ provided no court holds in favor of a taxpayer who objects to the
disallowance.
If the taxpayer claims a deduction for an item that is not an allowable deduction, and the IRS
fails to detect that claim, the item ends up being an allowed deduction even though it was not
allowable. This conclusion is evident from the provision in section 1016 requiring reduction of
adjusted basis by the amount of depreciation allowed with respect to the property, though not to
be less than allowable depreciation.75 If there were no such thing as an allowed but unallowable
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deduction, the reduction would equal allowable depreciation, for in no instance could the allowed
deduction be higher.
C. Judicial Examination of AAllowed@ and AAllowable@
The question of how the words Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ relate to each other was expressly
presented to and decided by the Tax Court in Lenz v. Comr.76 The taxpayers took the position
that allowable deductions and allowed deductions are different concepts, whereas the IRS argued
that these terms have the same meaning for purposes of section 163(d) even though they Amay
have different meanings in other contexts.@ The Court soundly rejected the IRS position:
Throughout the Code, a distinction is made between the terms Aallowable
deduction@ and Aallowed deduction@, which distinction is not insignificant. Day v.
Heckler, 735 F.2d 779, 784 (4th Cir. 1984). Unfortunately, as with many terms of
art in the area of tax law, these terms are often interchanged with one another,
causing confusion. We must rely on the words of the statute as generally
understood, and to do otherwise would be to redraft the statute. United States v.
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985). AAllowed@ and Aallowable@ have fixed
meanings in the tax arena, and we interpret statutes using these terms in light of
their understood meanings except where to do so would create absurd results. See
United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-543
(1940).
AAllowable deduction@ generally refers to a deduction which qualifies under a
specific Code provision whereas Aallowed deduction@, on the other hand, refers to
a deduction granted by the Internal Revenue Service which is actually taken on a
return and will result in a reduction of the taxpayer's income tax. See Reinhardt v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 511, 515-516 n.6 (1985); see also sec. 1.10163(a)(1)(i)(a), Income Tax Regs. Respondent in fact defined the terms Aallowable@
and Aallowed@ in I.T. 2944, XIV-2 C.B. 126 (1935), as follows:
The word Aallowable@ designates the amount permitted or granted
by the statutes, as distinguished from the word Aallowed@ which
refers to the deduction actually permitted or granted by the Bureau.
Thus, one might have an item of expense which is allowable as a deduction;
however, the deduction is not allowed. In Day v. Heckler, supra at 784, for
example, it was noted that certain land clearing expenses were an Aallowable
deduction@ under the Code; however, such deduction would not be Aallowed@
unless the taxpayer made an election to take such deduction.77
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The analysis in Lenz has been followed by other courts. In Sharp v. United States,78 the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit relied on a dictionary definition of Aallowable@ as Apermissible:
not forbidden or improper,@79 noted that an item can be an allowable deduction even if it does not
provide a tax benefit, and pointed to the reduction of adjusted basis by allowable depreciation
regardless of whether the deduction was Aactually taken.@80 In Flood v. United States,81 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit quoted with approval the definition of Aallowed deduction@ set
forth by the Tax Court in Lenz.82
What is important about Lenz is not simply the affirmation of the difference between Aallowed@
and Aallowable@ but the surprising attempt on the part of the IRS to argue that the two words had
the same meaning within the context of section 163. It is this sort of advocacy that contributes to
the confusion overshadowing the question of whether all deductions are mandatory.
In Reinhardt v. Comr.,83 a case cited by Lenz, the taxpayers= tax liability under the since-repealed
maximum tax on personal service income84 was in issue. One of the elements in computing that
limitation is personal service taxable income, defined as personal service income Areduced by any
deductions allowable under section 62 which are properly allocable to or chargeable against such
personal service income.@85 The taxpayers had received reimbursement for automobile expenses
which was properly included in gross income and treated as personal service income. The
taxpayers, though entitled to claim an offsetting deduction for automobile expenses, did not do
so, and the IRS did not compel the taxpayers to claim that deduction. However, when computing
the personal service income maximum tax, the IRS subtracted the automobile expense deduction.
The taxpayers objected, arguing that Aotherwise properly deductible expenses under sec. 1348
should be deducted only to the extent such expenses are allowed as deductions for the regular tax
computation.@86 Though the taxpayers= argument made no sense to the extent that its acceptance
by the court would increase, not decrease, their income tax liability, the court explained the
taxpayers= analytical error as follows:
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While we do not see how it helps petitioners, they may be drawing a distinction
between a deduction "allowed" and one "allowable." Sec. 1348(b)(2) provides in
part that the term personal service net income means personal service income
reduced by any deductions allowable under sec. 62 which are properly allocable to
or chargeable against such personal service income. Whether the automobile
expenses were allowed as a deduction on petitioners' return is not determinative of
whether such expenses are allowable as a deduction under sec. 1348. See, for
example, sec. 1016(a)(2) and sec. 1.1016-3(a)(1)(i), Income Tax Regs., regarding
the definitional difference between allowed and allowable.
Unquestionably, the use by Congress of the term Aallowable@ rather than the term Aallowed@ in
now-repealed section 1348(b)(2) demonstrates that the latter word does not mean the former, and
that for there to be a difference there must exist allowable deductions that are not allowed
because they are not claimed and thus not allowed. In fact, this is what occurred in Reinhardt.
The taxpayers failed to claim a deduction allowable to them, and the IRS did not compel them to
claim that deduction for purposes of computing their income tax liability, even though the IRS
correctly subtracted the deduction in computing personal service net income for purposes of
determining the limitation on the taxation of personal service income.
What is important about Reinhardt, and perhaps even more important about Lenz is the notion
that allowed deductions do not include allowable deductions that do not reduce the taxpayer=s
income tax. In its simplest manifestation, this notion makes sense, for surely it is pointless to
allow a deduction that leaves the taxpayer=s tax liability unchanged or causes it to increase. Yet
this notion, as so expressed, does not answer the question of whether a taxpayer may forego a
deduction that would decrease tax liability in order to obtain some other benefit, for the taxpayer
or some other person, because the requirement that it be Aactually taken on a return@ begs the
question of whether the taxpayer is required to claim the deduction on the return.
IV. Lessons from How Unclaimed Depreciation Is Treated
Statutory distinctions between Aallowable@ depreciation deductions and Aallowed@ depreciation
deductions support both an affirmative and a negative response to the question of whether
deductions are mandatory. The support provided for the negative response is much stronger,
though, than what can be gathered for the affirmative answer.
Section 167 provides that there Ashall be allowed@ a depreciation deduction, the computation of
which is addressed by both that section and section 168. Section 1016 then provides that the
adjusted basis of the depreciable property must be reduced by the allowed depreciation, but by no
less than the allowable depreciation, a requirement designed to generate gain if the property is
sold for an amount inconsistent with the property having decreased in value by as much as the
depreciation would indicate.
The reduction in section 1016 is equivalent to the greater of allowed or allowable depreciation,
which suggests not only that there can be allowed depreciation that exceeds allowable
depreciation but also that there can be allowable depreciation that exceeds allowed depreciation.

If the phrase Ashall be allowed@ in section 167 means Amust be claimed@ then the distinction in
the section 1016 reduction would not need to, and could not, exist.
It has been argued that in reducing adjusted basis by the amount of allowable depreciation, even
if a lesser amount has been claimed and allowed, Congress created a disincentive for taxpayers to
try preserving adjusted basis by omitting the depreciation deduction when claiming it would not
provide a tax benefit.87 Though this argument makes sense, it is nowhere as strong as it would be
had Congress drafted section 1016 to require reduction of adjusted basis by the amount of
allowable depreciation, plus any excess of improperly claimed and allowed depreciation in
excess of allowable depreciation. That the section 1016 basis reduction rule reinforces the
distinction between Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ cannot be denied, but whether it establishes a rule
of mandatory deductions applicable not only to depreciation but all other deductions is highly
questionable.
The reason this argument is questionable is found in the depreciation recapture provisions. By
limiting depreciation recapture to allowed rather than allowable depreciation, Congress
neutralizes the deterrent effect that the argument attributes to it. By permitting allowable but
unallowed depreciation to escape ordinary income characterization under the depreciation
recapture rules, Congress has acknowledged and implicitly approved the instances in which
taxpayers fail to claim otherwise allowable depreciation deductions. That is not to discount the
adverse impact on a taxpayer of reducing adjusted basis by the amount of allowable depreciation,
even if it was not claimed,88 but is intended to illustrate that the adverse impact is far less than
what it could be if Congress wanted the strongest possible disincentive for failure to claim
depreciation.
The attempt to rely on the distinction in the section 1016 basis reduction between allowed and
allowable depreciation deductions to refute the argument deductions are mandatory also has been
criticized because Congress allegedly was more concerned with Aan allowable deduction that was
not claimed@ rather than Aan allowable deduction that was not allowed.@89 The statute, however,
does not refer to allowable deductions that are not claimed but to allowable deductions that are
not allowed. There is nothing in section 1016 to suggest that there can be unclaimed but allowed
depreciation deductions.
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V. Seeking Guidance from Legislative History
It has been suggested that the legislative history accompanying the introduction of adjusted gross
income into the federal income tax law admits of no conclusion other than that deductions are
mandatory.90 The Senate Finance Committee stated:
Eleventh, the bill introduces a new concept, adjusted gross income. It is defined to
mean gross income less business deductions, deductions attributable to rents and
royalties, and losses treated as losses from the exchange or sale of property. In the
case of an employee, adjusted gross income consists of gross wages or salary less
expenses of travel or lodging in connection with his employment. It will be seen,
therefor, that in general adjusted gross income means gross income less business
deductions.91
This language, however, does nothing to answer the basic question because no adjective is used
to modify the phrase Abusiness deductions,@ the word Adeductions@ in the phrase Adeductions
attributable to rents and royalties,@ the word Alosses,@ or the word Aexpenses.@ There is no more or
less support for arguing that adjusted gross income means Agross income less allowable business
deductions@ than there is for arguing that adjusted gross income means Agross income less
allowed business deductions.@ As has been explained, both Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ are used in
section 62 to describe the deductions that are subtracted from gross income in order to compute
adjusted gross income.
The Senate Finance Committee Report also explained:
Fundamentally, the deductions...permitted to be made from gross income in
arriving at adjusted gross income are those which are necessary to make as nearly
equivalent as practicable the concept of adjusted gross income, when that concept
is applied to different types of taxpayers deriving their income from varying
sources...For example, in the case of an individual merchant...gross income under
the law is gross receipts less cost of goods sold. Similarly, the gross income
derived from rents and royalties is reduced by the deductions attributable
thereto...in order that the resulting gross income will be on a parity with the
income from interest and dividends in respect of which latter items no deductions
are permitted in computing adjusted gross income...92
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Yet again the language does little, if anything, to resolve the question of whether deductions are
mandatory. On the one hand, a phrase such as Athe deductions ... permitted to be made@ suggests
that deductions are permissible but not mandatory. On the other hand, a phrases such as Agross
income from rents and royalties is reduced by the deductions@ suggests that the reduction takes
place, though the absence of an adjective such as Aallowed@ or Aallowable@ to modify the word
deductions leaves that phrase no more useful than its counterpart in the first quotation from the
Senate Finance Committee report. To the extent Agross income under the law is gross receipts
less cost of goods sold@ is advanced as determinative, the weakness of this language is that it
does not address deductions. Cost of goods sold is a reduction in the process of computing gross
income, and thus whatever gloss one wishes to put on the words Ais ... less@ loses its shine when
it is transferred to the world of deductions. If anything, Congress used the words Aless@ and
Areduced@ and not the verb Adeduct@ when referring to these reductions, thus highlighting the
difference between a reduction and a deduction.
VI. The Significance of Deductions Requiring an Election
Determining whether deductions are mandatory is further complicated by the existence of
Internal Revenue Code provisions that require a taxpayer election as a prerequisite to taking the
deduction. Even if the taxpayer satisfies all of the other requirements for the deduction, a
taxpayer can choose to ignore the election and thus forego the deduction.
For example, section 179 permits the taxpayer to elect to deduct some or all of the cost of eligible
property in the year of its acquisition, in an amount higher than would be deducted using the
standard depreciation deduction.93 Similar elections exist for the cost of pollution control
facilities,94 the cost of certain refinery property,95 the cost of qualified film and television
productions,96 expenditures for the removal of architectural and transportation barriers,97
reforestation expenditures,98 start-up expenditures,99 environmental remediation costs,100
corporate organizational expenditures,101 partnership organization and syndication fees,102 and a
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variety of other items a full listing of which is not necessary to demonstrate the point. Individual
taxpayers deduct itemized deductions if they elect to do so.103
The existence of these Aby election@ deduction provisions suggests that because Congress has
provided that for certain deductions taxpayers may choose to elect the deduction or ignore it, the
necessary inference is that for any other deduction the taxpayer has no such choice. The degree to
which this logical interpretation should dictate the answer to the question depends in part on the
purpose of Congress in requiring an election by the taxpayer for these selected deductions.
The election that Congress requires for these selected deductions is more than an expression of
choice. In every instance, there are specific instructions, provided either in the statute or in IRS
guidance issued pursuant to statutory authorization, that demand a litany of information from the
taxpayer. For example, the section179 expensing election requires the taxpayer to identify the
items of property to which the election applies. This sort of requirement permits the IRS to
determine if the taxpayer=s other deductions affected by the expenditure subject to the election
have been properly computed. In other words, these deductions are of such a nature that it is
insufficient for a taxpayer merely to claim them without providing additional information with
respect to the specific expenditures that are within the deduction. For deductions not tagged with
an election provision, omitting the deduction from the tax return does not implicate other
deductions or create a need for additional information.
Thus, the logical inference that the existence of deductions tagged with election provisions
means that all other deductions are mandatory is completely counter-balanced by the logical
inference that election provisions are tagged to those deductions claiming of which would leave
IRS verification of the taxpayer=s computation of other deductions difficult or even impossible.
This inference is buttressed by the other conditions that attach to the election provisions. Each
election provision contains language that directs the IRS to specify the time, manner, and place
for making the election. These requirements are consistent with the notion that the purpose of the
election is to give a platform for IRS collection of relevant information rather than to imply that
all other deductions are mandatory.
Tipping the balance in favor of treating elections as informational platforms rather than as
indirect imposition of a mandatory character on other deductions is unavoidable when the
significance of the terms Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ are re-visited. If deductions without election
provisions are mandatory, then the distinction between allowed and allowable would need to be
restricted to those deductions. Thus, for example, one would refer to allowable section 179
deductions, the maximum available to the taxpayer, and allowed section 179 deductions, the
amount actually claimed, but use of allowed or allowable with respect to section 168 deductions
would make no sense because under the mandatory deduction approach those deductions would
be required. Yet the distinction in section 1016 between allowed and allowable when computing
the reduction in adjusted basis on account of depreciation, and the distinctions in the depreciation
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recapture provisions between allowable and allowed depreciation, do not differentiate between
section 179 and section 168 deductions. When given the opportunity to treat allegedly mandatory
and voluntary deductions differently, Congress passed it up.
A closer look at the election to itemize deductions strengthens the argument that existence of the
election does not resolve the question, and can be viewed as support for the conclusion that
deductions are not mandatory. The analysis begins with section 63(a) which provides, AExcept as
provided in subsection (b), ... the term >taxable income= means gross income minus the
deductions allowed by this chapter (other than the standard deduction).@104 The exception in (b)
applies to any Aindividual who does not elect to itemize his deductions for the taxable year@ and
provides that in this situation, Athe term >taxable income= means adjusted gross income, minus (1)
the standard deduction, and (2) the deduction for personal exemptions...@105 Accordingly, there
are two definitions of taxable income, one for taxpayers who do not elect to itemize their
deductions and one for taxpayers who do so elect.
The statutory language for the election of itemized deductions is in the inverse: AUnless an
individual makes an election under this subsection for the taxable year, no itemized deduction
shall be allowed for the taxable year.@106 The language does not specify that if the election is
made, all itemized deductions must be claimed. It simply makes the election a prerequisite for
claiming itemized deductions. Itemized deductions, in turn, are defined as Athe deductions
allowable under this chapter other than (1) the deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross
income, and (2) the deduction for personal exemptions...@107 Itemized deductions, therefore, are
certain allowable deductions, but not necessarily allowed deductions.
Translated, these statutory provisions inform taxpayers that a portion of allowable deductions is
separated into a group called itemized deductions. No deduction may be claimed for an allowable
itemized deduction unless the taxpayer makes the itemized deduction election. If the taxpayer
does so, the taxpayer is free to deduct an itemized deduction, but the taxpayer is not required by
this language to deduct all allowable itemized deductions. If the taxpayer were required to deduct
all allowable itemized deductions once the election were made, the language would provide that
AAn individual who makes an election under this subsection for the taxable year must deduct all
otherwise allowable itemized deductions.@ Although the language of section 63(d) does not
specifically state that deductions are not mandatory, neither does the election it describes
specifically make deductions mandatory.
VII. The Depth of Legislative Grace
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The maxim delivered by the Supreme Court decades ago, that deductions are a matter of
Alegislative grace@108 has been repeated by that Court and others close to two thousand times.109
Using the word Agrace@ to describe the legislative attitude underlying deductions is inconsistent
with the notion that deductions are mandatory. Grace in this context means favor, privilege, or
reprieve,110 all of which are acts that can be offered and rejected. Even from a theological
perspective, many religious denominations do not consider grace as a mandatory blessing but as a
gift that can be rejected.111
Undeniably, many deductions are enacted by Congress as tax incentives, designed to encourage
taxpayers to engage in particular activities or in some instances to refrain from specified
activities.112 Although some taxpayers engage in activities that would not otherwise get their
attention but for the tax deduction carrot dangled before them, other taxpayers would engage in
those activities even if no deduction was available, because they have other reasons to pursue
those activities.113 It defies the logic of tax incentives to insist that a taxpayer claim a deduction
for engaging in an activity because the tax deduction is not necessarily the aim of the taxpayer. In
other words, offering a reward might trigger a desired result, but it is nonsensical to interpret
deduction provisions as demanding the acceptance of the reward.
The legislative grace analysis does not persuade everyone. One commentator concluded that
AWhile deductions are a matter of legislative grace, the language of the code does not seem to
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make claiming a deduction optional.@114 He reached this conclusion by treating the word Ashall@
in section 63 as Anot may.@ However, as previously explained, the meaning of Ashall@ does
nothing to prove that the word Aallowed@ means Aclaimed@ rather than Aaccepted if claimed.@ In
other words, the language of the code does not make deductions a matter of legislative command.
VIII. Lessons from Specific Instances Involving Foregone Deductions
A. Dependency Exemption Deductions
Although the Congress, both in its legislative drafting and its committee reports, offers little in
the way of unassailable authority on the question of whether deductions are mandatory, the IRS
speaks volumes when it interprets the dependency exemption deduction. Recall that section
151(a) provides that A[i]n the case of an individual, the exemptions provided by this section shall
be allowed as deductions in computing taxable income.@ If the Adeductions are mandatory@
interpretation of the phrase Ashall be allowed@ is accepted as conclusive, the personal and
dependency exemption deductions are mandatory. Yet that is not how the IRS has treated these
deductions. Though the IRS could be wrong, its position in this respect is predictive of its
position on the question generally.
One instance in which the question is significant is the section 25A Hope Scholarship115 and
Lifetime Learning credits,116 which cannot be claimed by a taxpayer with respect to whom a
section 151 dependency exemption deduction is allowed to another taxpayer.117 If the value of
the credit to the dependent outweighs the value of the dependency exemption deduction to the
other taxpayer, the other taxpayer has incentive to forego the dependency exemption deduction.
An obvious instance in which this incentive would exist is the other taxpayer having adjusted
gross income so high that his or her exemption deductions would be phased down to zero under
section 151(d)(3).
If all deductions that Ashall be allowed@ are mandatory, the taxpayer entitled to the dependency
exemption deduction would be required to claim it, and the dependent would be foreclosed from
claiming the section 25A credits. That result, however, is inconsistent with the drafting of section
25A(g)(3). If Congress intended to preclude all dependents from claiming the section 25A credit,
it would have used the word Aallowable@ in section 25A(g)(3), namely, AIf a deduction under
section 151 with respect to an individual is allowable to another taxpayer .... no credit shall be
allowed under subsection (a) to such individual....@ Evidence that Congress can use the word
Aallowable@ when it so chooses is found in section 151(d)(2), which states: AIn the case of an
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individual with respect to whom a deduction under this section is allowable to another taxpayer
... the exemption amount applicable to such individual ... shall be zero.@ In other words, a parent
who chooses not to claim a dependency exemption deduction for a dependent child cannot, by
doing so, change the child=s zero personal exemption amount to anything other than zero. If
Congress wanted that choice to be available it would have used the word Aallowed@ rather than
Aallowable@ in section 151(d)(2).
Both section 25A(g)(2) and section 151(d)(2) reflect the existence of situations in which
taxpayers choose to ignore a dependency exemption deduction. Neither provision insists that the
taxpayer take the deduction that section 151(a) says Ashall be allowed.@ Instead, section
25A(g)(3) describes what happens if the section 151 deduction is foregone.
The IRS addressed this precise situation in PLR 200236001. The parents chose to forego the
dependency exemption deduction allowable to them with respect to one of their children. Even
though the amount of that child=s personal exemption remained zero, that child was permitted to
take the section 25A credit because no section 151 dependency exemption deduction had been
allowed to the parents with respect to that child. The IRS concluded that the deduction was not
an allowed deduction because the parents did not claim it, putting the IRS, in this instance, on the
side of those who argue that a deduction must be claimed in order to be allowed, and that failure
to claim a deduction pulls it out of the category of Aallowed@ deductions. The IRS explained:
Congress deliberately chose the Aallowed@ standard for the education tax credit
because that standard permits more flexibility to a family than does the
Aallowable@ standard found in '151. See H. Rep. 105-148, 105 Cong., 1st Sess.,
1997-4 C.B. (Vol. 1) 319, 639-640. That flexibility is illustrated by the facts of
this case. Although neither the taxpayer nor his parents could derive any tax
benefit from the operation of the '151 rules, his modified AGI was low enough
that he C although not his parents C could derive some tax benefit from the
education tax credit. The intra-family allocation of the credit to the taxpayer C
which the parents achieved by not claiming him as a dependent C conferred a tax
advantage upon the family as a whole, in a manner consistent with Congressional
intent.
The flexibility to which the IRS refers is the ability of a taxpayer to forego claiming an allowable
deduction in instances in which the word Aallowed@ is used to describe the deduction. At no point
in its analysis did the IRS take the position that the words Ashall be allowed@ in section 151(a)
precluded the parents from foregoing the deduction.
B. Section 183 Not-for-Profit Activities
The IRS also contributes important guidance to the effect of foregoing deductions in its
regulations interpreting section 183(d). Under section 183(d), an activity is presumed to be an
activity engaged in for profit, and thus unaffected by the prohibition in section 183(a) on the
deduction of expenses attributable to activities not engaged in for profit, if the gross income
derived from the activity exceeds Athe deductions attributable to such activity@ for three or more

of the five taxable years ending with the taxable year for which the determination is made.118
There is a more generous provision of two years out of seven, rather than three out of five, that
applies to certain horse-related activities,119 but that difference does not affect the analysis related
to the question of whether deductions are mandatory.
As explained in II, E, above, section 183(d) provides an incentive for a taxpayer to forego
deductions in order to fit within the for-profit presumption. Thus, a taxpayer whose activity has
shown a profit in two of the preceding four years and losses in the other two needs to show a
profit in the current, fifth year in order to avoid retroactive denial of the losses deducted in the
two previous loss-generating years. Foregoing some deductions in order to show a profit would
make sense if the tax savings from those losses exceeds the tax benefits of the foregone
deductions.
Section 183(d) does not address the question of whether deductions can be ignored for this
purposes. The statute simply states, parenthetically, that in determining whether gross income
from the activity exceeds deductions, the deductions are to be Adetermined without regard to
whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit.@ That parenthetical language is necessary to
prevent a loop of reasoning, but it does not define Adeductions@ in any other way.
In regulations, the IRS clarifies the statute by setting forth the presumption in the following
terms: AIf for ... [a]ny two of five consecutive taxable years ... the gross income derived from an
activity exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity which would be allowed or allowable
if the activity were engaged in for profit, such activity is presumed ... to be engaged in for
profit.@120 By using the phrase Aallowed or allowable@ the IRS, in effect, has accepted the
existence of allowable deductions that are not claimed, and thus not allowed. If the word
Aallowed@ means what the Adeductions are mandatory@ proponents contend, the regulation could
have been written as follows: AIf for ... [a]ny two of five consecutive taxable years ... the gross
income derived from an activity exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity which would
be allowed if the activity were engaged in for profit, such activity is presumed ... to be engaged in
for profit.@ The fact that the word Aallowable@ is joined with Aallowed@ reinforces not only the
point that the two words have different meanings but also the view that there can exist deductions
that are allowable but not allowed, namely, that there can be foregone deductions. Of course, in
this instance the IRS takes the position that foregone deductions nonetheless are taken into
account in determining whether there is an excess of gross income over deductions that would
trigger the for-profit presumption. In other words, the taxpayer is free to ignore the deductions,
but that won=t give the taxpayer any section 183(d) advantage.
This specific issue reached the Tax Court in Dyer v. Comr.,121 involving taxpayers who failed to
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deduct real property taxes and insurance with respect to an activity in order to make the activity
show a profit so that challenges to the alleged for-profit status of the activity could be forestalled.
The court noted that A[c]reation of such an artificial profit tends to adversely influence the
question of profit motive.@122 Significantly, the taxpayer was not required to deduct the otherwise
deductible expenses but simply denied for-profit status, thus precluding the portion of the
deductions that exceeded gross income from the activity. The court cited one case,123 but that
case involved deductions which the taxpayers tried to shift to a different taxable year without
giving up their claim to the deduction. That case, therefore, adds nothing to the analysis.
C. The Bad Debt Deduction
Section 166 states that Athere shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes
worthless during the taxable year.@124 In James A. Messer Co. v. Comr.,125 the Tax Court
explained that Aa taxpayer who fails to deduct a bad debt in the year in which it becomes wholly
worthless loses the deduction.@126 The court relied on the principle that a taxpayer may not shift a
deduction that the taxpayer wishes to claim from the year for which it is allowable to a later
year,127 but concluded that by ordering its affairs with respect to the debt so that the
worthlessness occurred in a year of the taxpayer=s choosing the taxpayer was gaining a tax
advantage Anot to be equated with tax evasion@128 where other factors also favored the timing of
the taxpayer=s actions in seeking foreclosure on the property securing the debt.
The court=s description of a failure to claim a deduction is not that the taxpayer is compelled to
file an amended return or otherwise to make the claim, but simply that the deduction is lost. Such
an outcome is inconsistent with the concept of mandatory deduction, and not only was the
argument that Ashall be allowed,@ which appears in section 166, means Amust be claimed@ not
presented to, or discussed by, the court, that language did not preclude the court=s description of
an unclaimed deduction as one that the taxpayer loses.
D. Prior Law Income Averaging

122

Id. at ___, n.6.

123

Brown v. Comr., 36 T.C.M. 77 (1977).

124

'166(a).

125

57 T.C. 848

126

Id. at 860.

127

See Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. Comr., 32 T.C. 43 (1959), aff=d, 279 F.2d 368
(10th Cir. 1960).
128

57 T.C. at 862,

Under the income averaging method of tax computation that was repealed in 1986,129 the
taxpayer=s taxable income for each of the three taxable years preceding the taxable year for which
income averaging was applied was part of the income averaging computation.130 In Lynch v.
Comr.,131 the taxpayers argued that they were entitled to use income averaging even though they
could not produce a copy of their federal income tax return for one of the three taxable years
preceding the year in issue. The court accepted the taxpayers= testimony that they searched
unsuccessfully for the return, and that the accountant who prepared it was dead. The taxpayers
produced evidence of their income, which was corroborated by evidence produced by the
employer. The taxpayers, on brief, Astated that they were willing to forego the personal
exemptions and any other deductions for 1968 to which they may be entitled for the purpose of
income averaging.@132 The court accepted the taxpayers= testimony and evidence, and ignored all
deductions in determining the taxpayers= taxable income for purpose of the income averaging
computation.
It is significant that the taxpayers were not required to claim any deductions, and that their
taxable income was computed without regard to any deductions. There were no provisions in the
former income averaging rules specifically defining taxable income for income averaging
purposes in a manner different from how it is defined generally. If deductions are mandatory, the
waiver by the taxpayers in Lynch of their deductions should have been rejected. It wasn=t. That
the taxpayers in Lynch were permitted to forego the personal exemption deduction, despite the
Ashall be allowed@ language in section 151, was consistent with the conclusion reached in VIII,
A, above, that Ashall be allowed@ does not preclude taxpayer failure to claim that, or any other,
deduction barring a specific provision to the contrary.
E. Prior Law Exception to Charitable Contribution Deduction Limitation
Under a long-since repealed provision in section 170, certain taxpayers were permitted to ignore
the then-in-effect 20-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income and 10-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income
limitations133 applicable to the charitable contribution deduction.134 A taxpayer qualified for this
unlimited charitable contribution deduction if, for the taxable year in question and for eight of the
ten preceding taxable years, the sum of the taxpayer=s charitable contributions plus the income
taxes paid by the taxpayer exceeded 90 percent of the taxpayer=s taxable income for the year.135
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In Rev. Rul. 67-460,136 the IRS considered a situation in which a taxpayer, by disregarding a
portion of the charitable contributions, would cause income tax liability to increase, thus making
the sum of income taxes plus charitable contributions greater than 90 percent of taxable income.
The IRS concluded that for purposes of determining if the 90 percent test was met, all of the
taxpayer=s charitable contributions must be taken into account in computing income taxes paid.
In GCM 33522, the IRS explained that nothing in section 170 authorized the taxpayer to deduct
only a portion of charitable contributions when determining total income taxes paid for purposes
of the 90 percent test, and that doing so would create, in effect, an intermediate deduction
limitation that does not exist in section 170.
From the General Counsel Memorandum=s careful explanation of the facts and the language used
in the ruling as it progressed through the IRS, some insight is available. If the taxpayer=s income
tax was computed after limiting charitable contributions to 30 percent of adjusted gross income,
the sum of the income tax and the total contributions exceeded 90 percent of taxable income.
However, this qualified the taxpayer for the unlimited charitable contribution, which reduced the
taxpayer=s income tax liability to the point where it, when added to total charitable contributions,
no longer exceeded 90 percent of taxable income. Put simply, there was an algebraic flaw in the
statute.
In December of 1965, the IRS issued a ruling letter, concluding that if the taxpayer computed tax
liability by deducting all otherwise qualified charitable contributions, and failed to meet the 90
percent test, the charitable contribution deduction would be subject to the combined 30-percentof-adjusted-gross-income limitation. The flaw was demonstrated by the impact of imposing the
combined 30-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income limitation, namely, income tax liability could
increase to the point where, when added to total charitable contributions, it exceeded 90 percent
of taxable income. The ruling letter stated that there is no statutory authority in section 170 to
deduct only the portion of total charitable contributions that would generate a tax that, when
added to total charitable contributions, would exceed 90 percent of taxable income.
The Office of IRS Chief Counsel concurred in the ruling letter, and the Interpretative Division
informally concurred on October 21, 1966, in the language of a proposed publication on the issue
covered by the private ruling letter, even though a proposed General Counsel Memorandum on
the issue had not been issued because of the deadline for the ruling letter. The proposed
publication was not approved at the Assistant Commissioner=s Briefing Session held on October
27, 1966, and the proposed publication was redrafted. When the revision was submitted to the
Interpretative Division in January of 1967, it identified a possible conflict between the second
paragraph of the proposed publication and the private ruling letter issued in December of 1965 to
the taxpayer. The proposed second paragraph stated:
The 90 percent requirement, in the year for which the unlimited charitable
contribution deduction may be allowable, must be met after applying the
unlimited charitable contribution deduction in computing the income tax liability
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for such taxable year. Furthermore, the amount of the charitable contributions
used in determining whether the 90 percent requirement is met must be the same
amount used as the unlimited charitable contribution deduction in computing the
income tax liability.
The Interpretative Division thought that this language would Aconvey the impression@ that the
amount of charitable contributions used to determine income tax liability and to determine if the
90 percent test was met need not be the actual total charitable contributions but merely the same
number. It was the disagreement between the ruling branch and the Interpretative Division that
brought the matter to Chief Counsel.
Chief Counsel explained that its concurrence in the December 1965 letter ruling was based on its
conclusion that there was no statutory authority in section 170 to compute the 90 percent test
using only a selected portion of the charitable contributions. The General Counsel Memorandum
then set forth a second reason for rejecting the use of only a portion of the charitable
contributions in determining if the 90 percent test was met:
Even if it were assumed that taxpayer could qualify for the unlimited deduction
(which we could not do, in the face of the express statutory provisions referred to)
we still could not condone the practice of understating the allowable charitable
contributions deduction, or any other deduction item, in order to increase
taxpayer=s tax liability, so as to enable him to claim the unlimited charitable
contributions deduction. We know of no precedents, and taxpayer cited none,
establishing that a taxpayer may intentionally understate a deduction item in
reporting his tax liability for the purpose of gaining a tax advantage. In fact, the
only authority found supports the opposite conclusion. See Rev. Rul. 56-407, C.B.
1956-2, 564 to the effect that an individual may not understate his allowable
deductions in order to increase his net earnings from self employment (which
would in turn entitle him to larger social security benefits upon his retirement than
he would otherwise receive had he reported his correct liability).
G.C.M. 33522 then recommended the inclusion of the following language in the proposed
revenue ruling:
In a taxable year for which the unlimited charitable contribution deduction is
claimed, the full amount of the taxpayer's charitable contributions must be taken
into account in computing his income tax liability as well as in determining
whether the 90 percent requirement has been met.
However, when issued, Rev. Rul. 67-460 used different language:
[I]n a taxable year for which the taxpayer seeks to qualify for the unlimited
charitable contribution deduction, in determining whether the 90 percent
requirement has been met, the full amount of the taxpayer=s charitable
contributions must be taken into account in computing his income tax liability. It

is not permissible in such computations to take into account only a portion of the
actual charitable contributions (whether or not such portion is more or less than 30
percent of adjusted gross income) for the purpose of increasing the income tax
liability thus computed, and thereby qualifying for the unlimited charitable
contribution deduction.
The impact of G.C.M. 33522 and Rev. Rul. 67-460 on the broader issue of whether all
deductions are mandatory or whether only certain deductions, for specific purposes, are
mandatory, is at best, confusing. Though obsolete, because they deal with computation of a
limitation no longer in the Code, the Memorandum and the ruling present their own peculiar
interpretative challenges.
It is essential to note that despite language in G.C.M. 33522 suggesting that no deduction, not
just charitable contributions, could be understated, the language proposed by the Memorandum
and the language used in the Rev. Rul. 57-460 does not address the amount of any deduction
other than the charitable contribution deduction. Something, not disclosed in G.C.M. 33522,
modified the analysis between the broad statement about deductions generally and the much
more narrow proposed language. It is not unreasonable to surmise that a statement opining that
no deduction may be ignored was recognized as inconsistent with the existence of deductions,
such as the dependency exemption deduction discussed in VIII, A, above, which Congress and
the IRS contemplate taxpayers may choose to forego.
It is also essential to consider carefully the limited scope of Rev. Rul. 67-460. Its requirement
that the full amount of the charitable contributions deduction be taken into account applies Ain
determining whether the 90 percent requirement has been met.@ This is very different from the
language proposed in G.C.M. 33522, which specifically would have required use of the full
amount of the taxpayer=s charitable contributions Ain computing his income tax liability as well
as in determining whether the 90 percent requirement has been met.@ So not only did undisclosed
analysis water down G.C.M. 33522 from its wide-open assertion that all deductions must be
claimed to a focus only on charitable contribution deductions, the same, or other, undisclosed
analysis further watered down the Memorandum from requiring use of all charitable contribution
deductions in computing both taxable income and the 90 percent test, to a revenue ruling that
required full use of charitable contribution deductions only in computing taxable income for
purposes of the 90 percent test. Theoretically, therefore, a taxpayer could then proceed to accept
denial of the unlimited charitable contribution deduction and claim no charitable contribution
deduction on the return.
It is likely that what happened is awareness by those involved of the dangers posed when using a
revenue ruling focused on a narrow issue to proclaim a universal rule of tax law. Perhaps
someone did point out that taxpayers ignore deductions, and that all the IRS need assert was the
requirement that all charitable contribution deductions be used in determining if the 90 percent
test was met. That the likelihood that this is how the scenario played out is reinforced by an
understanding of what the IRS confronted. A taxpayer had demonstrated the existence of an
algebraic circle in the application of the 90 percent test, and the IRS chose a reasonable, and
perhaps the most plausible way, of breaking the impasse. Though the private ruling and the

proposed, but rejected, public ruling seemed only to require consistency, G.C.M. 33522 and Rev.
Rul. 67-460 ultimately required consistent use of the full charitable contribution deduction in
resolving the computational deadlock inherent in the badly-drafted, and fortunately repealed,
unlimited charitable contribution 90 percent test.
The legacy of G.C.M. 33522 is this sentence: AWe know of no precedents, and taxpayer cited
none, establishing that a taxpayer may intentionally understate a deduction item in reporting his
tax liability for the purpose of gaining a tax advantage.@ That the taxpayer did not cite any is not
surprising, for surely the taxpayer approached the issue as a narrow one analyzing a specific subparagraph of section 170. That the IRS Chief Counsel=s Office did not identify any precedents
suggests that a quick scan of regulations and rulings did not turn up any useful information. How
the Bureau of Internal Revenue pronouncement on the difference between allowed and allowable,
discussed in III, B, above, and venerable even in 1967, escaped notice and discussion is a puzzle.
Almost all of the other authority that bears on the question of whether deductions are mandatory
had not yet appeared when Rev. Rul. 67-460 was winding its way through bureaucratic review.
Nonetheless, the significance to be accorded the problematic sentence in G.C.M. 33522 must be
diminished because it antedates subsequent contrary authority, because the IRS itself has
subsequently accepted the concept of allowable deductions unclaimed in order to obtain tax
benefits such as the education credit, because it constitutes dictum, because it did not make its
way into Rev. Rul. 67-460 nor into the Memorandum=s ultimate recommendation, and because a
General Counsel Memorandum is not binding authority but simply the opinion of an attorney.
Worse, G.C.M. 33522 never addressed the Aallowed@ versus Aallowable@ issue that had been the
subject of analysis by its predecessor Bureau and by several courts, an omission consistent with
the bizarre argument raised by the IRS in Lenz, as discussed in III, C, above, that the two words
have the same meaning. Perhaps IRS thinking several decades ago had not yet evolved to where
it is now, open to the idea, as described in VIII, A, above, that there is no object to taxpayers
failing to claim an allowable deduction in order to obtain a tax benefit.
In the final analysis, Rev. Rul. 67-460 and G.C.M. 33522 do not resolve the question. Nor are
they inconsistent with the position that only certain deductions, for specific purposes, are
mandatory. Were the unlimited charitable contribution deduction still in the tax law, Rev. Rul,
67-460 and G.C.M. 33522 simply would be illustrators of one more item on what is a very short
list.
IX. Lessons from the Self-Employment Tax
A. Computing Self-Employment Income
Other than the attempt to construe Ashall be allowed@ as meaning Amust be claimed,@ proponents
of the Adeductions are mandatory@ view find their strongest support in the treatment of deductions
for purposes of computing the self-employment tax.137 The analysis involves two decades-old
revenue rulings, a Chief Counsel Advice Memoranda, and a case.
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In Rev. Rul. 56-407,138 the IRS stated, simply:
The question has been presented whether taxpayers may disregard depreciation
and other allowable deductions in computing net earnings from self-employment
for self-employment tax purposes. Held, under section 1402(a) of the SelfEmployment Contributions Act of 1954 (chapter 2, subtitle A, Internal Revenue
Code of 1954), as amended, every taxpayer, with the exception of certain farm
operators, must claim all of his allowable deductions, including depreciation, in
computing his net earnings from self-employment for self-employment tax
purposes.
After describing how certain farm operators must deal with deductions in light of the optional
method of computation available to them, and noting that certain partnerships may qualify for the
optional farm operator computation, the IRS stated, in what appears to be its reasoning: ASection
208 of the Social Security Act, as amended, provides penalties for a person who makes any false
statement or representation in connection with any matter arising under the Self-Employment
Contributions Act of 1954, for the purpose of obtaining or increasing benefits under the Social
Security Act.@
What the IRS did not state is that failure to claim allowable deductions increases selfemployment income, which in turn increases social security benefits because, within limits, a
person=s social security benefits are higher if his or her covered income, including selfemployment income, is higher.139 The IRS relied on a specific statute that precludes a taxpayer
from foregoing deductions for the specific purpose of increasing social security benefits. This is,
however, only one of the many reasons for foregoing deductions that are described in II, above,
and does not address the foregoing of deductions for any other purpose.
B. Shifting Deductions for Purposes of Self-Employment Income Computation
The IRS followed up Rev. Rul. 56-407 with another revenue ruling, in which it concluded that a
taxpayer could not increase self-employment income by having his wife pay his business
expenses.140 This revenue ruling, however, does not address deductions that the taxpayer was
giving up, but deductions that the taxpayer was trying to shift to another taxpayer. It is one thing
to debate whether a taxpayer must claim all allowable deductions, but it is a very different
question to ask if a taxpayer may shift deductions to another taxpayer. The answer to the latter
question is sufficiently settled in the negative to make extensive discussion redundant. That
answer also does nothing to inform the answer to the first question.
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C. Computation of Social Security Benefits
Almost thirty years later, the question surfaced in litigation over denial of social security benefits
by the Secretary of Health and Human Resources (HHS), which removed quarters of coverage
from the taxpayer=s earnings record, thus reducing the amount of her benefits.141 The applicable
HHS regulation, paralleling section 1402, defined net earnings from self-employment, used in the
calculation of benefits, as AYour gross income, as figured under subtitle A of the Code, from any
trade or business you carried on, less deductions attributed to your trade or business that are
allowed by that subtitle.@ HHS argued that for purposes of computing social security benefits, Aall
deductions allowed by the tax code must be included when calculating net income -- regardless
of whether, for tax purposes, such deductions were in fact taken by a claimant.@
Because when HHS acts on its own to remove quarters of coverage from a claimant=s earnings
record it has the burden of proving it acted correctly, the court noted that the interpretation placed
by HHS on the applicable HHS regulation, put Aan extraordinary and onerous responsibility on
the Social Security Administration@ because it requires HHS to be Aa tax expert@ in identifying
Adeductions which are not taken by a claimant [but] nevertheless ... included when computing
net income if they are >allowed= by the Code@ and Aimproper tax deductions@ taken by the
claimant but not permitted under the tax law. Though the court expressed reluctance to agree
with an HHS regulation that it considered to be Abased on the dubious premise that there is one
objectively correct and identifiable set of deductions that apply to a claimant in any given year,@
it accepted the HHS interpretation of the regulation and turned to the question of whether HHS
had properly applied its interpretation to the facts.
The Court concluded that HHS erroneously treated as deductions land clearing expenses that the
taxpayer could have deducted had she elected to deduct them under section 182 but which she
had not elected to deduct and that absent the election the deductions were not Aallowed@ to the
taxpayer. To the HHS assertion that the deduction was Aallowable@ and thus should be taken into
account in computing self-employment income, the court responded with the observation on
which the court in Lenz relied, as described in III, C, above, namely, AThe distinction between an
>allowable= deduction and an >allowed= deduction is not insignificant.@ Ultimately, though, the
court, by dealing with deductions that are allowed only if there is a taxpayer election, did not
address the more difficult question of whether a taxpayer can ignore deductions not the subject of
an election. In other words, the court did not approve or disapprove Rev. Rul. 56-407, which,
surprisingly, was not cited or mentioned. That, however, simply could be a consequence of the
fact IRS lawyers did not argue the case for HHS.
D. The Earned Income Tax Credit Cross-Reference
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Decades after Rev. Rul. 56-407 was issued by the IRS, the Chief Counsel to the IRS, in CCA
200022051, applied the conclusion in Rev. Rul. 56-407 to the determination of a taxpayer=s
earned income for purposes of the earned income tax credit.142 Because section 32(c)(2), which
defines earned income for purposes of the earned income tax credit, specifically incorporates by
reference section 1402(a), the interpretation advanced by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 56-407 for
purposes of section 1402(a) applies with equal force to section 32(c)(2). The same approach
would apply to the two other income tax provisions that specifically incorporate by reference
section 1402(a), the one that defines earned income for the purposes of determining if a selfemployed individual is an employee for purposes of determining if a trust is a qualified
retirement plan trust,143 and the one that defines earned income for purposes of determining a
self-employed individual=s compensation for purposes of determining eligibility for simple
retirement accounts.144 No other income tax provision allowing deductions makes a crossreference to section 1402(a).
It is critical to the analysis of the mandatory deduction question to read carefully the first
conclusion reached in CCA 200022051: AIn cases where the taxpayer reports net earnings from
self-employment without claiming the applicable business expenses, the net earnings from selfemployment must be adjusted by those business expenses. The taxpayer's EIC and selfemployment tax liability are both computed on the adjusted net earnings from self-employment.@
The conclusion was not stated as an overarching general rule but as a specifically tailored
analysis focused on two, and only two, situations, namely, computation of self-employment
income for purposes of social security benefit calculations and for purposes of the earned income
tax credit.
E. Health Insurance Costs of Self-Employed Individuals
Several years after CCA 200022051 was issued, Chief Counsel considered the section 162(l)
deduction for medical insurance costs paid by self-employed individuals.145 In CCA
200623001,146 the Chief Counsel noted that it had previously concluded Athat a self-employed
individual who is a sole proprietor may deduct, pursuant to '162(l) of the Code and subject to the
limitations in '162(l), insurance costs for the medical care of the sole proprietor and his or her
spouse and dependents when the health insurance policy purchased by the sole proprietor is
issued in his or her individual name rather than in the name of the sole proprietor's trade or
business.@147 After receiving that advice, the IRS officials seeking it returned to ask Awhether sole
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proprietors may deduct health insurance costs on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business.@148
Chief Counsel provided the answer in these words:
Under '162(I)(4), the deduction shall not be taken into account in determining an
individual's net earnings from self-employment (within the meaning of '1402(a))
for purposes of Chapter 2. Accordingly, the deduction under '162(l) must be
claimed as an adjustment to gross income on the face of Form 1040. The current
2005 Form 1040 provides for the deduction on Line 29. Therefore, a selfemployed individual may not deduct the costs of health insurance on Schedule C.
Advocates of the Aall deductions are mandatory@ approach point to the word Amust@ in the second
sentence of the quoted conclusion as proof that the taxpayer has no choice in the matter, doing so
by capitalizing the word.149 However, the word Amay@ in the second paragraph of the CCA, Aa
self-employed individual ... may deduct ... insurance costs@ was disregarded and not highlighted.
If the use of the word Amust@ in connection with the issue of where a claimed deduction must be
set forth meant that the deduction itself must be taken, the second paragraph would have been
written Aa self-employed individual ... must deduct ... insurance costs.@ Instead, the CCA states
the obvious, namely, that section 162(l)(4) prohibits the taxpayer from setting forth any claimed
deduction on Schedule C because it is not permitted in the computation of self-employment
income, thus leaving it to be claimed on the face of Form 1040. As one commentator so aptly put
it: A[A]ll this says to me is that the deduction cannot be taken on schedule C, and that it >must= be
taken, if it is to be taken at all, as an above the line adjustment on the 1040.@150
Certainly the drafting of the CCA could be better. It would not be precedent, but it would raise
fewer false hopes on one side or the other of the argument had it said, in effect, either AThe
deduction must be claimed and it must be claimed on the face of Form 1040" or AIf the taxpayer
chooses to claim the allowable deduction, it must be claimed on the face of Form 1040.@
Considering the precedent Amay deduct@ language in the CCA, the most reasonable interpretation
is that the CCA stands for the following proposition: AThe taxpayer may claim the deduction. The
deduction, if claimed, must be set forth on the face of Form 1040.@ Otherwise the word Amay@ in
the second paragraph has no meaning.
F. Significance of Self-Employment Income Computation
The attempt to cast Rev. Rul. 56-407 and CCA 200022051 as standing for the proposition that all
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allowable deductions must be claimed fails on two grounds. First, the language in the ruling and
the Advice Memoranda is carefully drafted to limit its applicability to the computation of selfemployment income for purposes of section 1402 and for purposes of the earned income tax
credit. It does not state the suggested general rule. Second, if either issuance did state, or could be
interpreted as stating, such a general rule, it would conflict with the analysis in the Lynch
decision, discussed in VIII, C, above. The fact that the ruling was not cited in Lynch buttresses
the argument that its efficacy is limited and its analysis inapplicable to the question generally.
Similarly, if the ruling or the Advice Memoranda stated, or is interpreted as stating, a general rule
requiring all allowable deductions to be claimed, it would conflict with sections 1016, 1245, and
1250, which, as described in III, A, 3, and IV, above, indisputably contemplate and permit
taxpayers failing to claim allowable deductions. It also would conflict with the IRS= own
treatment of foregone dependency exemption deductions as described in VIII, A, above.
Thus, Rev. Rul. 56-407 and CCA 200022051 do not provide an answer to the question of
whether all allowable deductions must be claimed for income tax purposes. They provide an
answer to a very limited set of circumstances, the computation of self-employment income for
purposes of section 1402 and the earned income tax credit. That they are drafted in narrowly
focused terms and not as a general rule suggests that they are exceptions to a general rule. If they
are in fact exceptions to a general rule, then the position that they take would be the opposite of
the position taken in a general rule, namely, that a taxpayer is not required to claim allowable
deductions, a conclusion consistent with statutory analysis, IRS conclusions with respect to other
areas of the tax law, and several judicial opinions. The self-employment income definition issue
teaches a lesson, but it is not the one that those who contend all allowable deductions must be
claimed think it teaches.
X. Intentional Failure to Comply with Deduction Requirements
A. In General
To a certain extent, the question of whether taxpayers must claim all allowable deductions is a
theoretical one. Although in some instances, the IRS, if it so chose, could detect the existence of
an unclaimed but allowable deduction, in most situations the information available to the IRS
would not reveal the existence of allowable deductions that the taxpayer chose to forego. This
raises five significant practical concerns, discussed in B through F, below.
B. Record-Keeping Requirements
It is deceptive to consider the record-keeping requirement under section 6001151 as the answer to
the question. The regulations issued under section 6001 require Aany person required to file a
return of tax under subtitle A ... to keep such permanent books of account or records ... as are
sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or other matters required
to be shown by such person in any return of such tax ...@152 The quoted provision begs the
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question, because it applies to Adeductions ... required to be shown@ but does not identify the
deductions that are required to be shown. The IRS takes the position that this regulation
provision permits it to require substantiation of self-employment income for earned income tax
credit purposes and to permit it to disregard any self-employment income not substantiated by the
taxpayer.153 The taxpayer must keep records, therefore, only if the deduction is claimed, but the
proposition that all allowable deductions are mandatory is not compelled by the section 6001
regulations.
C. IRS Awareness of Allowable but Unclaimed Deductions
Aside from the few types of allowable deductions the existence of which can be detected by the
IRS, the existence of most allowable deductions comes to the attention of the IRS only because
the taxpayer has claimed the deduction. Thus, unless on audit the IRS makes inquiries one might
not expect, such as ADo you have any unclaimed but allowable deductions?@ rather than ADo you
have any unreported gross income?@ the question of whether allowable deductions must be
claimed is highly unlikely to surface. This probably explains why there is so little authority and
so few cases addressing the issue.
The IRS, theoretically at least, is aware of some allowable state and local tax deductions because
those are reported on Forms W-2 issued to the taxpayer and also delivered to the IRS. The IRS
also receives copies of partnership, trust, and S corporation returns, including Schedules K-1, and
thus, theoretically at least, has access to allowable deductions passed through by those entities to
their partners, beneficiaries, or shareholders. In some instances, issuance of a Form 1099 alerts
the IRS to the existence of a potential deduction allowable to the payor. These situations, though,
pale in comparison with the number of transactions that might generate allowable deductions but
that leave no paper trail for the IRS to investigate unless the taxpayer chooses to make it known
by claiming a deduction or unless the IRS Acares@ about unclaimed allowable deductions and
makes inquiries. The latter appears to occur only with respect to self-employment earnings for
purposes of section 1402 and the earned income tax credit.
It is possible for the IRS to detect unclaimed allowable deductions by conducting a full-fledged
net worth audit.154 As a practical matter, it would be very difficult for the IRS to prove that net
worth would have been higher but for an allowable, but unclaimed, deduction.155 One
practitioner reports that most audit requests focus on proof that the taxpayer paid a claimed
deduction, and that outside of estate tax and project audits, the IRS has not requested all of the
checks written by the taxpayer.156
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IRS reaction to the existence of allowable but unclaimed deductions outside of the section 1402
and earned income tax credit context was demonstrated in LaForge v. Comr.,157 and Gaines v.
Comr.158 In LaForge, the court noted that the taxpayer had failed in prior years to deduct the club
tabs at issue in the case because Ahe was unaware that they may have been deductible.@159 Yet in
analyzing the deductibility of the expenses at issue, the court did not put into the equation the
amounts that could have been but were not claimed as deductions, and the IRS did not request it
to do so. In Gaines, one of the factors taken into account in deciding if the taxpayer=s
understatement of tax was due to fraud was the taxpayer=s Awillingness to give up what would
otherwise be allowable deductions.@160 Neither the IRS or the Court compelled the taxpayer to
claim those deductions, but the taxpayer=s decision to forego the deductions was considered a
factor in proving the taxpayer was trying to hide cash income by doing so.161
D. Substantiation Failure
Almost all deductions are subject to some sort of substantiation requirement.162 Therefore, the
easiest way for a taxpayer to push an allowable deduction out of the picture is to ignore
compliance with the substantiation requirements. For example, a taxpayer could decline receipts
for traveling expenses. Although the tax law requires substantiation if the taxpayer wants to
claim a deduction, there is nothing in the tax law that requires a taxpayer to accept receipts for
traveling expenses. Similarly, a taxpayer who receives an acknowledgment letter from a charity
is not prohibited from tossing it in the recycling or trash bin. Doing so, of course, negates a
prerequisite for the deduction that the taxpayer is trying to avoid. Thus, as a practical matter, the
notion that a taxpayer must claim all allowable deductions loses its force with respect to most
deductions because the taxpayer=s own actions can make the expense not allowable as a
deduction. At least two groups of commentators think that some taxpayers, in the words of one
group, Amay choose not to claim a ... deduction ... because the paper work isn=t worth the amount
of the deduction.@163
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That taxpayers are not required to maintain substantiation records but simply are denied
deductions if they fail to do so is illustrated by Henson v. Comr.164 In that case, the taxpayers
asserted that they had made cash contributions to their church, offering into evidence a calendar
with numbers penciled in on certain Sundays. They did not make contributions by check, and did
not keep any other record, because they described such record-keeping as against their religious
beliefs. Although the Tax Court estimated the taxpayers= contributions under the Cohan
doctrine,165 the court stated, ABy choosing, in accordance with their religious beliefs, not to keep
records of their contributions to the church, petitioners merely chose not to qualify for the
charitable contribution deduction.@ It is important to note that the court, though allowing the
taxpayers to deduct an estimated amount, did not compel the taxpayers to keep records nor to
deduct what otherwise would have been allowable. The Tax Court reacted in the same manner
when the same taxpayers appeared before it with respect to a subsequent taxable year.166
The Tax Court=s analysis in Beatty v. Comr.167 corroborates the Henson result, although it
involved a different deduction and a different taxpayer justification for refusing to produce the
required substantiation. The taxpayer had claimed a political contributions deduction under
section 218 as it existed before its repeal by the Revenue Act of 1978.168 The taxpayer testified
that he had made the contribution, but refused to provide documentary substantiation because he
considered that requirement to infringe his rights of privacy. The taxpayer stated Athat if
verification was required of him then he was willing to forego the deduction as the price for
preventing the government from interfering in his private affairs.@ Rather than compelling
production of the evidence, or making an estimate under the Cohan principle, the court simply
concluded that Ait appears that petitioner has conceded this issue, especially since he neither
requested findings of fact with respect to it nor addressed it in his brief.@ The taxpayer was
permitted, therefore, to forego the deduction by refusing to substantiate it.
E. The Risk of Fraud and Penalties
Is it possible that deliberate destruction of documents supporting an undesired deduction, or
failure to request a receipt for an undesired deduction, would trigger a tax fraud prosecution?169
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Are there penalties for failure to claim a deduction?170 No instance of such a prosecution or
penalty has turned up.
The absence of fraud prosecutions for failure to claim allowable deductions is not puzzling.
There are taxpayers who seek to reduce the risk of an audit, despite the low risk of audit faced by
taxpayers generally, by taking very cautious positions on their returns.171 Even some preparers
advise against claiming deductions that generate losses because they think Athe IRS is more likely
to audit providers who show business losses.@172 For example, taxpayers may undervalue
property donated to charity, or might omit office-in-home deductions,173 knowing that these are
items that increase the chance of an audit.174 If fraud charges, or even civil penalties, were
asserted against these taxpayers, the negative public reaction would be rapid and intense. It is
doubtful anyone would consider these taxpayers guilty of tax fraud.175
It is not unknown, in the world of tax compliance and audits, for taxpayers to reach into a bag of
Aallowable but unclaimed@ deductions to replace claimed deductions that are disallowed by the
IRS during an audit.176 Though one can argue with the strategic value of such an approach, it
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appears as though the IRS has never proposed penalties on these taxpayers for having failed to
claim the deductions in the first place.
F. IRS-Prepared Returns
When a taxpayer fails to file a return, the IRS will prepare the return, known as a substitute for
return, or SFR.177 When preparing an SFR, the IRS uses income information available to it from
third party reporting, but does not estimate deductions.178 The IRS position is that Adeductions are
a matter of legislative grace that a taxpayer must establish he or she is entitled to@ and that Ain a
deduction case, the burden of proof never shifts to the Service.@179
Though the IRS gives the taxpayer an opportunity to present evidence of deductions to include on
the return,180 the IRS does not require the taxpayer to do so. As a practical matter, the taxpayer is
not compelled to claim allowable deductions, and if the taxpayer fails to generate evidence
proving a right to the deduction, the deduction is not allowed.181 One practitioner reports that
SFRs Anever have any deductions,@ an observation consistent with the published IRS position.182
Even when dealing with section 1402, one must wonder if the IRS would insist on manufacturing
deductions to be reported on an SFR for a non-filing sole proprietor in order to push the
taxpayer=s self-employment income below $400 so that four quarters of social security coverage
could be denied to the taxpayer. The long-term benefit to the fisc of reducing the taxpayer=s
benefits, something that might not happen if the taxpayer generates coverage quarters in other
years, surely is outweighed by the decreases in immediate income tax revenues that would be
caused by the manufactured deductions.
XI. Policy Considerations
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Any tax question for which the answer is not unassailably incontrovertible is more sensibly
analyzed when tax policy considerations are taken into account. With respect to the mandatory
nature of deductions and credits, the chief consideration should be whether a taxpayer=s omission
of a deduction would damage the tax system.
If, as a matter of policy, some sort of grave harm would be caused to the income tax system by
taxpayers foregoing deductions, the existing statutory framework gives no hint of such a concern.
It would not be unreasonable to add to the Code a provision requiring taxpayers to claim all
allowable deductions. Such a provision might even simplify the tax law. But whether that ought
to be done is a totally different question from whether existing law requires such a result. It does
not.
For example, the tax system is not harmed if a taxpayer, unwilling to disclose the identity of his
or her favorite charities, chooses to claim no charitable contribution deductions. In such an
instance, as in many others, the impact on the fisc is an increase in tax revenue. Though the IRS
will refund to a taxpayer taxes that are overpaid on account of computational errors, there is no
evidence that the IRS has acted, or would act, to generate a refund based on unclaimed
deductions, chiefly because the IRS rarely has knowledge that the deduction exists.
There are policy concerns, however, if by ignoring a deduction or credit, the taxpayer=s tax
liability is decreased, a quirky result possible in what is quickly becoming a less than uncommon
situation. Three important situations are those involving the alternative minimum tax, the earned
income tax credit, and the education credit, discussed in II, B, F, and G, above. Ironically, the
answers for the two for which there are answers diametrically oppose each other. There is no
question that taxpayers may forego a dependency exemption deduction to make the education
credit available to the dependent, something that would be done when the deduction=s value to
the taxpayer is less than the credit=s value to the dependent. There is no question that overstating
income for purposes of the earned income tax credit is prohibited, and the cross-reference in the
credit provision to the computation of self-employment income, enacted after the IRS concluded
that self-employment deductions must not be omitted, suggests that in that narrow instance
deductions cannot be ignored. In this environment, finding a stable policy benchmark is much
like trying to walk on jello.
There also are policy concerns when taxpayers forego deductions in order to obtain benefits other
than tax benefits. Those concerns, however, are not matters of tax policy but questions for those
designing the benefit program in question. The IRS and the Social Security Administration have
been unambiguous in rejecting the idea that one=s social security benefits can be inflated by
omitting self-employment deductions. Yet taxpayers have been known to forego dependency
exemption deductions not only to qualify the dependent for the education credit, but to establish
the dependent=s independence for borrowing purposes, or for state welfare and similar benefit
programs. Any bank, government agency, or state legislature that ties qualification to federal
income tax reporting needs to determine if it wants the relevant item to be the reported item or
the item as it would have been reported had the taxpayer, or some other taxpayer, claimed all
allowable deductions. To this extent, those issues are beyond the scope of the present Article,
though they certainly deserve study and analysis.

Another policy consideration involves fairness. A taxpayer who keeps meticulous records but
determines to forego a deduction makes it easier for the IRS to discover the deduction and, when
and if it so chose, to demand that the taxpayer claim it. In contrast, the taxpayer whose record
keeping is sloppy and incomplete is much less likely to meet such a demand. Requiring
taxpayers, as a matter of policy, to claim all deductions would punish, in some sense, careful
taxpayers and reward the careless ones. Worse, it would give careful taxpayers an incentive to be
inattentive and forgetful, to say nothing of Aaccidentally@ throwing out documents. Thus, a rule
requiring all allowable deductions to be claimed is one that should be adopted, if at all, only
through a legislative process that involves hearings and debate, and not through some poorly
written Chief Counsel opinion or poorly argued tax case.
Yet another policy consideration involves legislative competence. In several instances, the
inducement to forego deductions arises from ill-conceived or badly drafted statutory provisions
that cause tax liability to decrease if deductions are omitted. Such was the case with the algebraic
circle masquerading as an unlimited charitable contribution deduction now relegated to what is
hopefully eternal rest in the tax law=s scrap heap. Making the earned income credit more valuable
as income increases is yet another example of short-sighted planning. Most importantly, the
fiasco with the alternative minimum tax, an imposition reaching more taxpayers each year,
demonstrates the pitfalls of trying to be Atoo cute@ when the drafting of tax legislation becomes
part of, and enables, the tax game.
Ultimately, the tax policy analysis causes the question to end up close to where it began. What
difference does it make if a taxpayer chooses to ignore one tax advantage in order to obtain
another? Put another way, does it come down to a requirement that a taxpayer choose the path
that leads to the highest tax liability?
The answer may lie in the proposition set forth decades ago by Judge Learned Hand, namely:
AOver and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as
to keep taxes as low as possible.@183 Surely a taxpayer can choose to reduce or eliminate
deductions by failing to qualify for the deduction or by refraining from making a payment. Why,
then, should a taxpayer be prohibited from ignoring the payment and its qualification as an
allowable deduction if doing so is not specifically prohibited by a statutory provision mandating
the deduction?
Consider for example, the alternative minimum tax, the area of tax law in which the mandatory
deduction question is almost certainly going to surface as a serious, practical problem. Congress,
in enacting the alternative minimum tax has said, in effect, AThose taxpayers who take advantage
of certain tax breaks, such as deductions and credits, often end up with tax liability less than we
want it to be when we see the outcome of the computations. So, because you took advantage of
these tax breaks, we will have you compute a different taxable income that omits certain of these
183
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deductions and credits.@ If a taxpayer chooses not to take advantage of one or more of these tax
breaks, should that taxpayer be saddled with the Acorrective measures@ of the alternative
minimum tax? Why is it so wrong, or bad, for a taxpayer to forego a taxpayer-favored provision
and simultaneously forego the Acorrective measure@ meted out to those taxpayers who do take
advantage of those tax breaks? The question is, of course, rhetorical, because the answer is
simply that it is not wrong or bad to do so, especially when there is nothing in the statute saying
that it is prohibited.
XII. CONCLUSION
There is ample evidence in the statute itself that allowable deductions will go unclaimed. For
example, the provision permitting a dependent to claim the education credit if the personal
exemption deduction allowable with respect to the dependent is foregone by the other person
hammers home the futility of arguing that the statute, or any other authority, compels the other
person to claim that dependency exemption deduction. Similarly, requiring taxpayers to reduce
adjusted basis by the amount of allowable depreciation, even though it has not been claimed, and
exempting allowable but unclaimed depreciation from the depreciation recapture rules undercuts
the argument that all deductions are mandatory and thus must be claimed.
The few courts facing the question have not compelled taxpayers to claim all allowable
deductions and have not provided a path to a resolution of the issue. The IRS has not acted as
though all deductions are mandatory. Aside from a poorly drafted, and ultimately extraneous
remark in a Chief Counsel Advice, the IRS has not purported to compel taxpayers to claim all
allowable deductions. Only in two limited situations, for limited purposes, has the IRS taken the
position that certain deductions must be claimed. One involves the computation of selfemployment income for social security purposes. The other involves the earned income tax credit
issue, itself tied by cross-reference to the self-employment question.
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that a taxpayer is not required to claim an
allowable deduction unless a statutory provision so requires, or a binding judicial precedent so
specifies. It would be unwise, of course, to forego a deduction that the IRS considers mandatory,
such as those claimed by self-employed individuals with respect to their self-employment,
whether for purposes of the self-employment tax or the earned income tax credit. Until the statute
is changed or some other binding authority is issued, there is no reason taxpayers who wish to
forego deductions, such as the dependency exemption deduction, should hesitate in doing so.

